We analyze the listing decisions of a retailer who may ask her suppliers to make upfront payments in order to be listed. We consider a sequential game with upfront payments being negotiated before short-term delivery contracts. We show that the retailer is more likely to use upfront payments the higher her bargaining power and the higher the number of potential suppliers. Upfront payments tend to lower the number of products o¤ered by the retailer when the products are rather close substitutes. However, upfront payments can increase social welfare if they ameliorate ine¢ cient listing decisions implied by short-term contracts only.
Introduction
During the last decades the retail industry has witnessed signi…cant changes. Both the growing concentration among retailers as well as the ongoing consolidation process towards fewer but larger store outlets have signi…cantly altered the vertical relations in the grocery channel (OECD 1998 , EU 1999 , FTC 2001 . Large retailers have become the essential intermediaries between manufacturers and consumers. Unless manufacturers have not passed "the decisionmaking screen of a single dominant retailer" (FTC 2001) , their products are not sold in …nal consumer markets. Retailers have therefore gained signi…cant gatekeeper control to …nal consumer markets. Additionally, the high frequency of new product launches has intensi…ed competition among suppliers for getting access to retail shelf space. 1 As a result, bargaining power has shifted in favor of retailers which enables them to set up rather complex delivery contracts. 2 This holds especially for new products where "...retailers and suppliers negotiate over the amount of upfront payments, introductory allowances per unit, marketing funds, and other special funds such as those used for in-store displays and demonstrations, couponing and customers' saving cards" (FTC 2003) . However, suppliers are also charged to keep already established goods on the shelf. All these di¤erent types of fees and allowances are lump-sum payments which are paid upfront. 3 Considering the competitive and allocative e¤ects of upfront payments, there is a contentious debate to what extent they may harm competition, consumers and suppliers. 4 Despite the growing literature on the pro-and anti-competitive e¤ects of upfront payments, however, no consensus concerning the pretended anti-competitive e¤ects of upfront payments has been reached until now.
Our model focuses on the interdependence between the listing decision of a retailer and her incentives to use upfront payments in order to extract surplus from her suppliers. Assuming that contracts between the retailer and her suppliers have to be negotiated, we show that a retailer is more likely to use upfront payments the more buyer power she has vis-à-vis suppliers. The 1 For example, the German food industry launches about 150.000 products every year, while retail assortments consist merely of 6.200 to 30.000 products in average (see Lebensmittelzeitung 2005) . Similar data for the U.S. is quoted by Sha¤er (2005) . 2 Both the trade press as well as the academic literature have documented a shift of relative bargaining power in the grocery channel in favor of retailers (see Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997, Sullivan 1997 ). 3 A survey on the actual debate on slotting allowances is provided by Klein and Wright (2007) . 4 See OECD (1998), EU (1999) , and FTC (2001, 2003 ) for a discussion. 2 retailer's buyer power increases in the number of her potential suppliers, the substitutability of suppliers' products, and the extent of her exogenously given bargaining power. Furthermore, upfront payments can increase social welfare if they ameliorate ine¢ cient listing decisions implied by short-term contracts only.
We consider a monopolistic retailer and a potentially high number of upstream suppliers.
Before the retailer negotiates delivery contracts with a subset of suppliers she may also ask her suppliers to make upfront payments in order to be listed. Whereas annual listing decisions serve to determine the suppliers whose products are to be o¤ered, terms of trade are determined for shorter time periods and can be readjusted during the period products are listed. While listing decisions and the associated upfront payments refer to long-term contracts, delivery contracts are determined for shorter time periods and can be readjusted during the period products are listed. This two-stage setting …ts the bargaining procedures typically observed in intermediate good markets.
Furthermore, we assume that the retailer is not in a position to make take-it or leave-it o¤ers.
Instead, long-term contracts and the associated upfront payments as well as short-term delivery contracts rely on negotiations between the retailer and her suppliers where gains from trade have to be shared. This approach is based on the observation that there are several reasons which restrict the bargaining power of a retailer. For example, after having built her sales outlet, the retailer is committed to a particular assortment structure. Sales counters for goods that need special treatments, such as frozen food, dairy products, fresh …sh and meat, can not be built up or reduced in the short run. There also exist "focal goods" and well-known brands the retailer has to o¤er in order to attract consumers. Hence, although the retailer can use her gatekeeper control to …nal consumer markets in order to extract surplus form her suppliers, she may not be able to fully extract all surplus. We therefore suppose that both short-term and long-term contracts rely on negotiations between the retailer and her suppliers. However, the retailer can decide whether to use long-term contracts or not.
Our model shows that upfront payments gain in importance when the retailer's buyer power increases. Furthermore, upfront payments signi…cantly alter the retailer's listing decision. Without upfront payments the retailer tends to choose an ine¢ ciently high number of products if products are rather close substitutes. Upfront payments induce the retailer to decrease the num-3 ber of products signi…cantly. The same results hold vice versa if the substitutability between the suppliers'products is rather low. In this case, the retailer will extend her assortment if she uses upfront payments. These observations are based on the fact that upfront payments allow the retailer to extract parts of suppliers'rents. The retailer's listing decisions thus tend to maximize overall pro…ts when upfront payments are used.
Our paper contributes to the expanding literature on upfront payments and retailer's listing policy. Aydin and Hausman (2007) consider a setting with a single retailer and a single multiproduct manufacturer. They …nd that due to double marginalization the industry-optimal level of variety is higher than that the retailer would o¤er. The retailer increases her o¤ered variety and thus resells the industry-optimal assortment if she demands upfront payments for each additional product to be listed. Slotting allowances can also be interpreted as a signaling (Kelly 1992 , Chu 1992 Suppliers expecting their products to be successful on downstream markets are willing to pay higher slotting fees than those expecting their products to fail. Suppliers may also use upfront payments in order to raise rival's costs (Sha¤er 2005) . Furthermore, there are several papers which explicitly focus on the competitive e¤ects of upfront payments imposed by retailers. For instance, Sha¤er (1991) considers a model with upfront payments leading to higher wholesale prices which in turn imply that downstream competition is softened. In Marx and Sha¤er (2007) competing retailers o¤er a common supplier a three-part tari¤ which entails a slotting fee and a two-part delivery tari¤. By o¤ering the manufacturer its own monopoly pro…t as a compensation for the upfront payment, a retailer can induce the manufacturer to rely on exclusive dealing which potentially high number of suppliers. Furthermore, we assume that neither the retailer nor the suppliers have take-it or leave-it power and that contracts have to be negotiated.
The model closest to ours is Marx and Sha¤er (2004) . They show that upfront payments may induce a retailer to limit her shelf space in order to capture more of the suppliers'pro…ts.
Considering two suppliers and sequential Nash bargaining between the retailer and the suppliers, the model of Marx and Sha¤er implies that upfront payments can mirror the outcome of an auction for getting access to limited shelf space. However, upfront payments and the induced limitation of shelf space are unpro…table for the retailer when her bargaining power is su¢ ciently high. In contrast to this result, our framework implies that upfront payments are more likely to be used by the retailer the higher her bargaining power.
With respect to the bargaining on upfront payments, our work is similar to de Fontenay and Gans (2003) who model the employment decision of a …rm taking into account wage bargaining in labor markets. Assuming that already employed workers are immediately replaceable by outside workers, they show that underemployment constitutes a pro…t-maximizing strategy for the …rm because the increased pool of potential workers outside can be used for squeezing inside wages.
This result contrasts the insights gained by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) , who show that …rms -given that workers are not replaceable -tend to hire an ine¢ ciently high number of workers in order to overcome their hold-up power. By considering di¤erent bargaining frameworks for upfront payments and short-term delivery contracts, our model combines the approaches of de Fontenay and Gans (2003) and Stole and Zwiebel (1996) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we …rst introduce our model and explain the di¤erent bargaining stages. In Section 3 we consider optimal consumer prices and the di¤erent contracts between the retailer and her suppliers. Section 4 focuses on the listing decision and the impact which long-term contracts have on social welfare. To illustrate our results, we consider a numerical example in Section …ve. The …nal section summarizes the main …ndings.
The Model
We consider a model with homogeneous consumers, one retailer and a set S N = f1; 2; ::::N g of manufacturers i = 1; 2; :::; N producing one product each. All products are supposed to be substitutable and the retailer decides which and how many products n N she distributes to …nal consumers. Let S n S N with jS n j = n N denote the set of suppliers whose products are resold by the retailer. Employing the generalized Dixit utility function, consumers'utility can be written as 5
where q i and p i denote the quantity and the price of a speci…c good i. While indicates the consumers'reservation price, substitutability between goods is measured by 2 [0; 1]. The number of consumers is normalized to one.
We assume that the suppliers bear no …xed costs and have constant marginal costs which we normalize to zero. In contrast, the retailer incurs …xed costs c(n) for the maintenance of outlet space and investments for in-store facilities like shelves, freezer and sales counters. We assume that these costs are increasing and strictly convex in n:
We distinguish two di¤erent types of contracts between the retailer and her suppliers. First, there are short-term contracts which specify the conditions under which the retailer can buy the products from the respective supplier. These short-term delivery contracts entail two-part tari¤s with a wholesale price w i and a …xed fee F i . We assume bilateral negotiations taking place simultaneously, whereas we focus on e¢ cient bargaining.
The second kind of contracts are long-term contracts which entail upfront payments to be paid by the suppliers. Long-term contracts are negotiated before short-term contracts and serve as a commitment device for the retailer. That is, given the retailer has agreed on longterm contracts with a set S n S N of suppliers, she can enter into short-term contracts with suppliers i 2 S n only. Again, we assume bilateral bargaining and that negotiations take place simultaneously. In contrast to the short-term contracts, however, we assume that renegotiations
Summarizing, we analyze the following four-stage game which we solve by backward induction: In the …rst stage, the retailer decides about the number of products n she o¤ers and whether or not she uses long-term contracts. If long-term contracts are used, they are negotiated in the second stage. In the third stage, short-term delivery contracts are negotiated. Finally, the retailer sets prices p i for all products she o¤ers.
Consumer Prices and Contracts
Starting with the market stage, we get consumers'demand by maximizing (1) with respect to all quantities q i with i 2 S n : Solving the respective …rst-order conditions and assuming interior solutions, optimal demand q i (p i; n; ) is given by
Using (3) and taking into account the payments induced by short-term delivery contracts, the (gross) pro…ts R and S i of the retailer and the supplier i 2 S n are given by
and
Note that R and S i do neither cover retailer's cost c(n) nor possible upfront payments implied by long-term contracts. Maximizing (4) with respect to the prices p i and using (3), it is easy to show that optimal prices p i (w i ) are given by
Substituting p i into the pro…t functions (4) and (5), let R (n; ) and S i ( ) denote the reduced pro…t functions of the retailer and the suppliers respectively:
Short-Term Contracts
Turning to the third stage of the game and thus to the negotiation on short-term delivery contracts, we assume that the retailer selects a set S n S N of suppliers with jS n j = n whose products she resells to …nal consumers. With each i 2 S n the retailer negotiates a simple twopart tari¤ with a wholesale price w i and a …xed fee F i . Negotiation takes place simultaneously.
Using the generalized Nash bargaining solution, the wholesale price w i is determined in order 
where 8 denotes retailer's pro…t if the negotiation with one particular supplier i 2 S n fails. Di¤erentiating (9) with respect to F i and w i ; we get
Following Chipty and Snyder (1999) we assume that agents believe that e¢ cient trade will occur between the retailer and all other suppliers. Since these beliefs will be justi…ed in equilibrium,
we can solve the system of equations (10)- (11) simultaneously for all F i and w i 8 i 2 S n . Using symmetry, we get
Employing (12), the reduced pro…t functions of the retailer and the suppliers without considering long-term contracts, i.e.
Rs i (n; ) and Ss i ( ), can be written as
and Ss i ( ) = F (n; ) = 1 n R(n; ) (n; ) for all i 2 S n ;
where R(n; ) and (n; ) are given by R(n; ) := 2 n 4(1 + (n 1) ) and (n; ) :
Analyzing (13) and (14) simple comparative statics with respect to n leads to:
The reduced pro…t function Rs (n; ) is strictly increasing in n; while Ss i ( ) and thus F (n; ) are strictly decreasing in n. Furthermore, considering the aggregate …xed-fee payments by the retailer, we get
Proof. These results can be proved by di¤erentiating (13) and (14) with respect to n and taking into account ; 2 (0; 1) as well as n 1.
The intuition for these results relies on the fact that aggregate demand increases in the number of products, while substitutability of products implies that suppliers'marginal contributions are decreasing in n. Hence, an increase in n has two positive e¤ects for the retailer: First, her revenues will increase; second, the …xed F payments will decrease.
Long-Term Contracts
Before the retailer starts to negotiate short-term delivery contracts with a subset of suppliers, she can also decide whether to employ long-term contracts in order to get upfront payments from her suppliers. In contrast to short-term delivery contracts, long-term contracts serve as a commitment device for the retailer. The agreement on long-term contracts enforces the retailer to negotiate delivery contracts with the respective suppliers. Correspondingly, upfront payments are tantamount to an assurance for suppliers to enter into negotiations on delivery contracts.
At the same time, long-term contracts allow the retailer to exploit her gatekeeper position by reaping at least some of the suppliers'pro…ts. However, we assume that the retailer is not able to extract all surplus. Long-term contracts and the implied upfront payments are presumed to be based on negotiations between the retailer and her suppliers.
Considering the bargaining process on long-term contracts we follow the model of de Fontenay and Gans (2003) . We assume that the retailer can immediately replace suppliers with whom negotiations on long-term contracts have failed. Let the initially selected suppliers i 2 S n S N be the insiders and the remaining N n = N jS n j suppliers be the outsiders. If the retailer bargains over long-term contracts with the insiders and if negotiations with one of the i 2 S n insiders fails, the retailer can start to negotiate with one of the remaining outsiders. Moreover, we assume that the retailer will never again enter into negotiations with those suppliers with whom negotiations have failed. Therefore, the number of outsiders is reduced by one, if negotiations with one of the insiders have failed. With jS n j = N the retailer is not able to replace any of the initially selected suppliers. To illustrate the implied bargaining process suppose n = 1 and N = 2. If the retailer starts negotiations with one of the two suppliers and if this negotiation fails, she can immediately start to negotiate with the other supplier. However, with n = 2 the retailer cannot replace any supplier in the case of negotiation breakdown. Consequently, the higher N and the lower n, the more credible the retailer can threaten to replace suppliers she bargains with. Thus, the retailer's bargaining position is the weaker the lower the number of potential suppliers.
We assume that negotiations between the retailer and all inside suppliers i 2 S n are bilateral and take place simultaneously. Furthermore, we assume rational beliefs and focus on the Nash bargaining solution. The analysis is further simpli…ed by the assumption of no renegotiations if n = N holds. 8 Starting with the case n = N , where outside suppliers are lacking for immediate replacement in the case of negotiation breakdown, the upfront payment G i of supplier i is determined by (see (13) and (14)):
Maximizing (16) with respect to G i , de…ning (n; ) := Rs (n; ) Rs (n 1; ) and assuming symmetry leads to the following equilibrium payments G (N; n; )
With n = N 1, there is one outside supplier for immediate replacement. Thus, the retailer's threat point in the initial negotiations is determined by Rs (N 1; )+(N 1)G (N 1; N 1; ).
Since Rs (N 1; ) does not change if an inside supplier is replaced by an outsider, the Nash bargaining solution can be determined by maximizing the following expression with respect to
Di¤erentiating (18) with respect to G i and using symmetry, we get
Solving (19) for the equilibrium payment G (N; N 1; ) leads to
Increasing the di¤erence between N and n further and solving the implied recursion formula for G (N; n; ) yields
Employing (21), retailer's pro…t with long-term contracts can be written as Rl (N; n ) = R(n; ) [1 (n; ) (N; n; )]
with (N; n; ; ) := 1 + (n 1) n
Using 2 (0; 1) and analyzing (N; n; ) shows (N; N; ; ) > 1 and lim N !1 (n; N; ; ) = 0. Comparing (13) and (22), we therefore get that the retailer will never use long-term contracts if N = n. On the other hand, the retailer will always bene…t from long-term contracts if N tends to in…nity as this implies that upfront payments are equal to the suppliers'pro…ts. 9 Considering the impact of n and N more carefully, yields:
Lemma 2 With N > n 2 there exist a unique critical k (N; n; ) such that G (N; n; ; ) > 0 , > k (N; n; ):
Furthermore, k (N; n; ) decreases in N while it increases in .
Proof. See appendix.
The retailer bene…ts from long-term contracts whenever her bargaining power is high enough. This is due to the fact that the …xed payments negotiated under short-term contracts are the lower the higher . While this decreases the suppliers'willingness-to-pay for being listed, it also increases the retailer's valuation of additional suppliers. Therefore, upfront payments tend to decrease in : Summarizing these results, we get:
The retailer can bene…t from long-term contracts if and only if her bargaining power is high enough and if the number of potential suppliers exceeds the number of products which can be listed. Furthermore, the retailer is more likely to use long-term contracts, the less substitutable the suppliers' products are.
Finally, it turns out that the following reformulation of Lemma 2 is quite helpful for the analysis of the retailer's listing decision:
Corollary 1 With N > n 2 there exists an critical value N k ( ; ; n) such that G (N; n; ; ) > 0 , N > N k ( ; ; n): Furthermore, N k ( ; ; n) decreases in while it increases in .
Assortment, Contracts and Social Welfare
Turning to the …rst stage, the retailer decides about the number of products she o¤ers. Besides …xing her assortment, she also determines whether or not she will negotiate with her suppliers 13 about an upfront payment. We …rst analyze the optimal number of products the retailer o¤ers to …nal consumers if the interaction between the retailer and her suppliers is based on shortterm contracts only. Subsequently, we turn to the case where suppliers have to agree on upfront payments before they enter into negotiations on short-term delivery contracts. The comparison of the optimal listing decisions under both regimes shows that long-term contracts tend to reduce the number of products listed by the retailer if products are rather close substitutes.
Furthermore, upfront payments are more likely to be used if the number of potential suppliers is high or if their bargaining power is low. While these results are in line with Proposition 1, it turns out that the substitutability between the suppliers'products has ambiguous e¤ects on the retailer's decision to use long-term contracts. In fact, in Section 5 we will analyze a numerical example which shows that the retailer may well use long-term contracts only if the products are rather close substitutes. Finally, considering social welfare, long-term contracts are more likely to lead to socially more e¢ cient listing decisions the higher the substitutability between the suppliers'products and the higher the retailers'bargaining power.
Short-term contracts
Considering short-term contracts only and taking into account the costs for providing shelf space, the maximization problem of the retailer is given by max n Rs (n; ) : = Rs (n; ) c(n)
= R(n; ) (1 (n; )) c(n) s.t. n N:
Di¤erentiating Rs (n; ) with respect to n; the …rst-order conditions for (24) can be written as 10
Rs n ( ) 0 and Rs n (n; )(N n) = 0:
Let n s ( ; ; N ) denote the solution of (25) and let n ( ; N ) de…ne the number of suppliers that maximizes industry pro…t, i.e.
Comparing n s ( ; ; N ) and n ( ; N ); we get:
Proposition 2 If only short-term contracts are negotiated and n ( ; N ) N , the retailer overlists as long as n ( ; ) > n k ( ), i.e. n s ( ; ; N ) n ( ; N ): With n ( ; ) < n k ( ) and n ( ; N ) N , the retailer underlists, i.e. n s ( ; ; N ) < n ( ; N ):
Proposition 2 shows that the retailer has a strong incentive to o¤er an ine¢ ciently high number of products as long as the …xed costs to extent her outlet are su¢ ciently low and is high enough. Note that low (high) …xed costs imply n ( ; ) > n k (n ( ; ) < n k ): Given low …xed costs and a high level of substitutability, the retailer bene…ts from the fact that the marginal contribution of each product and thus total payments to the suppliers decrease with each additional product. With high investment costs or highly di¤erentiated products, i.e.
su¢ ciently small , the retailer underinvests. That is, the retailer has an incentive to reduce his assortment ine¢ ciently since n < n k ( ) implies that total payments to the suppliers are the higher the more products are listed.
Long-term contracts
Let Rl (N; n ) denote the retailer's pro…t, when long-term contracts are used. Then, the maximization problem with respect to n can be written as
[R(n; ) (1 (n; ) (N; n; )) c(n)] s.t. n N:
Analyzing the …rst-order conditions for (27), i.e. 
Choice of contracts
Using n s ( ; ; N ) and n l ( ; ; N ) we now turn to the retailer's decision of whether or not she will use long-term contracts. While the use of long-term contracts is more likely the higher N and (see Proposition 1), the e¤ect of is less clear cut. Although upfront payments decrease in , the retailer can balance this negative e¤ect by reducing n. Therefore, with an endogenously chosen number of products long-term contracts may be more bene…cial for the retailer the higher the substitutability between the suppliers'products.
Corollary 1 and the fact that
Rl (N; n l ( ); ) c(n l ( )) is monotonically increasing in N imply that there must exist a critical value N ( ; ) such that 11
for all N > N . Using (29)- (30) and analyzing the impact of on N ( ; ) and thus on the retailer's choice of contracts, we get:
The retailer is more likely to use long-term contracts, the higher the number of potential suppliers. Moreover, with n ( ; ) > n k ( ) the critical number N ( ) decreases in ; as long as n s ( ) is large enough.
While proposition 4 focuses on the impact of N and , the degree of substitutability between suppliers'products a¤ects the retailer's contract decision ambiguously. This is due to the observation that @ @ R(n; ) < 0; @ 2 @ @n R(n; ) < 0 and @ @ [R(n; ) (n; )] < 0
as well as (see (44) in the appendix)
hold. Thus, while an increase of reduces the retailer's revenues, it has an additional negative e¤ect on her pro…t when long-term contracts are used. Hence, N ( ; ) increases in if all other e¤ects are ignored. However, assuming n s ( ) > n l ( ); (31) points to a negative correlation between N ( ; ) and . In Section 5, we analyze an example where @N ( ; )/ @ < 0 holds which also implies that long-term contracts are more likely to be bene…cial for the retailer the higher .
Di¤erentiating
Rl (N; n l ( ); ) c(n l ( )) with respect to N and using the envelope theorem, it follows immediately that the retailer's pro…t is monotonically increasing in N .
Social welfare
In order to analyze the implications of long-term for social welfare, we de…ne social welfare as the sum of consumers'and …rms'surplus. Denoting U ( ; n; N ) consumers'indirect utility function and using (3) and (15), social welfare W ( ; n; N ) can be written as
Maximizing W ( ) with respect to n and de…ning the number of suppliers that maximizes social welfare, i.e.
it follows immediately that social welfare is maximized by a higher number of suppliers than industry pro…t, i.e. n w ( ; N ) n ( ; N ). Furthermore, Proposition 2 implies n w ( ; N ) n s ( ; ; N ); whenever n ( ) < n k ( ): That is, if costs are su¢ ciently high, i.e. n ( ) < n k ( );
and only short-term contracts are negotiated, the number of products listed by the retailer undercuts the socially optimal number of products.
The relation between n w ( ) and n s ( ) is ambiguous for low cost, i.e. n ( ) > n k ( ). Comparing the respective …rst-order conditions for n w ( ) and n s ( ) yields
with :
While (34) indicates that short-term contracts may induce the retailer to choose a socially ine¢ cient high number of suppliers, it also shows that socially ine¢ cient overinvestment only occurs, if the retailer's bargaining power is rather low. More precisely, it is easy to show that
Considering < 1=2, (34) implies that w (n s ( ); ) tends to 1 as n s ( ) > n k ( ) approaches n k ( ). Furthermore, we get
with : n c ( ) :
Therefore, although socially ine¢ cient overlisting is possible for < 1=2, it never occurs if 1=2, if is small enough or if retailer's costs for o¤ering additional products are such that n s ( ) is lower then the critical number n c ( ).
Combining these results with Proposition 3 reveals that long-term contracts and the implied listing decisions are detrimental for social welfare, whenever n w ( ; N ) n s ( ; ; N ) and n s ( ; ; N ) n l ( ; ; N ). On the other hand, long-term contracts can enhance social welfare if either socially ine¢ cient overlisting is avoided, i.e. n w ( ; N ) < n s ( ; ; N ) and n s ( ; ; N ) > n l ( ; ; N ), or if we have n s ( ; ; N ) < n ( ; N ) and n s ( ; ; N ) < n l ( ; ; N ).
Analyzing the …rst case more carefully, note that
Taking into account the integer constrained n 2 N and comparing total payments to the suppliers, when the number of suppliers is increased from 1 to 2; we get
for all N 2. While an increase of the number of suppliers from 1 to 2 decreases the total payments under short-term contracts, the use of upfront payments implies a lower reduction of overall payments. In view of (39), we thus get that upfront payments can avoid socially ine¢ cient overlisting if the suppliers'products are rather close substitutes and if the marginal costs of increasing shelf space are not too high.
Finally, with n s ( ; ; N ) < n ( ; N ) short-term contracts lead to socially ine¢ cient underlisting which can be ameliorated by the use of upfront payments as long as N is high enough (see Proposition 3).
Numerical Example
In order to illustrate the above results more explicitly, we examine a numerical example. Let consumers'willingness to pay be = 10 and assume that the retailer's costs c(n) are given by c(n) = n 2 =10. Considering the cases N = 20 and N = 40 allows us to point out the impact of N: Furthermore, we take the integer constraint n 2 N explicitly into account. Assuming = 0:5, Figure 1 shows the optimal number of products listed, i.e. n s ( ; ) and n l (N; ; ) with N = 20 and N = 40. Obviously, the use of long-term contracts results in a reduced number of products listed by the retailer, whereas the di¤erence to the number of products accepted under short-term contracts only decreases the more substitutable the products are. Likewise, n l approaches n s ; the more potential suppliers are available for being listed. Considering the use of long-term contracts and comparing the retailer's pro…ts with and without long-term contracts, it turns out that the critical value N ( ; ) (see (29)) is decreasing in for all . Furthermore, for given N we can de…ne a threshold ls ( ; N ) such that 
since ls ( ; N ) is decreasing in . Hence, the retailer is more likely to choose long-term contracts the higher her bargaining power and the higher the degree of substitutability between the suppliers'products. While these results are based on endogenously chosen n l and n s ; the results summarized in Proposition 1 are obtained for given n:
Turning to social welfare, the shaded areas in Figure 2 Upfront payments are more likely to be used by the retailer the higher the buyer power the retailer has vis-à-vis her suppliers. That is, upfront payments are more likely to be bene…cial for the retailer the higher her bargaining power, the higher the number of potential suppliers and the lower the degree of di¤erentiation between the suppliers'products. With respect to social welfare, we show that the use of upfront payments is socially bene…cial if suppliers' products are either highly substitutable or if products are rather imperfect substitutes. While long-term contracts can avoid socially ine¢ cient overlisting induced by short-term contracts in the …rst case, they ameliorate socially ine¢ cient underlisting in the second case. Apart from these cases, long-term contracts are socially detrimental as they induce the retailer to ine¢ ciently reduce the extent of her retail assortment.
Considering the debate on the assessment of upfront payments, our results support a rule-ofreason approach. While upfront payments can reduce social welfare, they are socially bene…cial if highly substitutable products, like dairy products, are concerned or if the costs for providing shelf space are rather high. Furthermore, upfront payments are more likely to increase social welfare, the higher the retailer's buyer power. In view of the ongoing concentration process in the retail industry and the implied shift of bargaining power toward retailers, upfront payments thus tend to lead to socially more e¢ cient listing decisions.
Assuming 2 (0; 1) and N n 2; note …rst that we have
Thus, while N = n leads to G(N; n; ) < 0, we also have lim N !1 G (N; n; ) = lim n!1 F (n; ).
Furthermore, (46) indicates that there must exist a unique N k ( ; ; n) such that (N; n; ) < 1 , N > N k ( ; ; n).
Proof of Proposition 2
We …rst show that (25) has an unique maximum in n. To this end it is su¢ cient to show that @ @n Rs (N; n ) = 0 and n < N ) @ 2 @n 2 Rs (n; ) < 0:
Starting with the properties of Rs (n; ); it turns out that Rs (n; ) is log-concave, i.e. 
Using @ Rs (n; )=@n = c 0 (n) and (49), @ Rs (N; n )=@n = 0 implies @ 2 Rs (N; n )=@n 2 < 0 if c 00 (n) c 0 (n) > @ Rs (n; )=@n Rs (n; ) :
Employing (13), simple calculations show that the right-hand side of (50) is decreasing in and . Using = = 0; (50) can be written as c 00 (n) c 0 (n) > 1 2n n n 2 ; which corresponds to (2) . Turning to the comparison between n s ( ; ; N ) and n ( ; N ) and using lemma 1, it follows that n s ( ; ; N ) R n ( ; N ) , n ( ; ) R n k ( ) holds.
Proof of Proposition 3

24
To prove part one, consider …rst N = N k ( ; ; n s ( )). Comparing the …rst-order conditions (25) and (28), we get Rl n (N k (n s ; ); n s ; ) Rs n (n s ; ) = R(n; ) (n; ) @ @n (N k (n s ; ); n; ):
Evaluating @ (N k (n s ; ); n; )=@n for all ; 2 (0; 1) and n 3 reveals @ (N k (n s ; ); n; )=@n > 0.
Furthermore, using @ (N; n; )=@N < 0 (see (46)) implies @N k ( ; ; n)=@n > 0 for all ; 2 (0; 1)
and n 3. Therefore we must have n l ( ) < n s ( ) for all N N k ( ; ; n s ). Considering N > N k ( ; ; n s ) note …rst that lim N !1 (N; n; ) = lim N !1 n (N; n; ) = 0 and thus
Rl n ( ) = R n (n; ) c 0 (n). Hence, we get lim N !1 n l ( ; N ) = n ( ) < n s ( ; ). Now, assuming to the contrary that there exists a e N > N k ( ; ; n s ( )) such that n l ( ; ; N 1 ) > n s ( ; ), there must also exist N 1 < e N < N 2 such that n l ( ; ; N 1 ) = n l ( ; ; N 2 ) = n s ( ; ) and (52) 
Simple comparative statics for n l ( ; ; N ) leads to n l N ( ) R 0 , ' n (n; ) Q '(n; ) @ @n log[R(n; ) (n; ) (N; n; )]
with : '(n; ) = log 1 + (n 1) n < 0; ' n (n; ) > 0:
However, since n l ( ; ; N 1 ) = n l ( ; ; N 2 ) = n s ( ; ) > n ( ; ) requires @ @n [R(n; ) (n; ) (N i ; n; )] n=n l ( ; ;N i )
< 0 with i = 2; 3;
(52)-(56) lead to a contradiction. Turning to n s ( ; ; N ) < n k ( ) and again using lim N !1 (N; n; ) = lim N !1 n (N; n; ) = 0 shows that we must have n l ( ; ; N ) > n s ( ; ; N ) for N large enough.
Finally, inspection of (54) shows that '(n; ) @ @n log[R(n; ) (n; ) (N; n; )] is linearly increasing in N . This and the fact that n l ( ; ; N ) is bounded from above due to convex costs implies that we have n l N ( ) > 0 as N goes to in…nity. Therefore, n l ( ; ; N ) approaches n ( ; ) from below.
Proof of Proposition 4
While the …rst part of the proposition simply re ‡ects (29) and (30), the proof of the second part is more involved. Employing the envelope theorem, comparative statics with respect to leads to
with : l (n l ( ); ) := R(n l ( ); ) (n l ( ); ) (N ( ); n l ( ); )
and : s (n s ( ); ) := R(n s ( ); ) (n s ( ); ):
Furthermore, di¤erentiating @ s (n s ( ); )/ @n s partially with respect to and using n s ( ; ) > n k ( ) yields sign @ 2 s (n s ( ); ) @n s @ = sign [ 1 + (3 + (n s ( ; ) 2) )] > 0:
Now, de…ning e n(n l ( ); ) := max n nj l (n l ( ); ) = R(n; ) (n; ) o and evaluating we must have @N ( )/ @ < 0 whenever n s ( ) > e n(n l ( ); ) , l (n l ( ); ) > s (n s ( ); ). Considering the case l (n l ( ); ) < s (n s ( ); ), (58) and (59) indicate that @N ( )/ @ < 0 holds as long as n s ( ) is high enough.
